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Abstract—An objective of network neutrality is that the design
of regulations for the Internet will ensure that it remains a public,
open platform where innovations can thrive. While there is broad
agreement that preserving the content quality of service falls un-
der the purview of net neutrality, the role of differential pricing,
especially the practice of zero-rating remains controversial. Even
though some countries (India, Canada) have banned zero-rating,
others have either taken no stance or explicitly allowed it (South
Africa, Kenya, U.S.).
In this paper, we model zero-rating options available between
Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs)
and use these models to better understand the conditions un-
der which offering zero-rated services are preferred, and who
specifically gains in utility. We develop a formulation in which
providers’ incomes vary, from low-income startups to high-
income incumbents, and where their decisions to zero-rate are
a variation of the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game. We find
that if zero-rating is permitted, low-income CPs often lose utility,
whereas high-income CPs often gain utility. We also study the
competitiveness of the CP markets via the Herfindahl Index. Our
findings suggest that in most cases the introduction of zero-rating
reduces competitiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network neutrality, or simply net neutrality, is the principle
that Internet service providers (ISPs) treat all data on the
Internet equally, and do not discriminate or charge differently
by user, content, website, platform, application, type of at-
tached equipment, or method of communication [1], [2]. Net
neutrality advocates claim that such discrimination weakens
content providers’ (CP) investment incentives since ISPs can
expropriate some of the investment benefits [3], [4]. However,
net neutrality opponents argue that differential pricing, which
allows ISPs to charge end users different prices for data
originating from different websites (CPs), triggers investments
in broadband capacity and content innovation [5]. Although
by some definitions, net neutrality does not include issues
involving pricing, it is worthwhile to study how differential
pricing impacts the market and how data is ultimately treated,
where net-neutrality unarguably centers (i.e., user content,
etc.).
A commonly used practice of differential pricing is zero-
rating: a service where ISPs do not charge customers for
bandwidth consumed by specific applications and services,
while customers pay the bandwidth price for other used
services. Today, zero-rating is used in practice by particular
cellular network providers offering free access to selected
online services [6]. Proponents of zero-rating argue that of-
fering some services for free increases customer satisfaction
and online services usage, as they can access more data at a
given cost [7]. Critics argue that zero-rating leads to settings
where sponsored data allows more financially prosperous CPs
to pay for placement, which adversely affects smaller CPs who
cannot afford the same luxury [8], [9]. From this perspective,
zero-rating may create artificial scarcity and jeopardize the
achievement of the net neutrality rationale [10].
Unfortunately, arguments to date, such as the above, are
qualitative, and there is no formal model that would allow
concerned parties to quantitatively ascertain how zero-rating
ultimately impacts the marketplace. Thus, there is no way to
quantify the extent of the win or loss that a heterogeneous
mix of ISPs, CPs, and users experience based on enabling or
disabling a zero-rated service.
In this paper, we formally model Internet settings in which
zero-rating is a service offered by ISPs to the CPs who deliver
their content to users, who are customers and obtain CPs’ con-
tents through their chosen ISPs. We perform 1) a macroscopic
analysis, i.e. zero-rating impacts on the competitiveness of the
market as a whole, 2) a microscopic analysis, i.e., zero-rating
impacts on the behavior and decisions of individual ISPs and
CPs. We use our models to quantitatively analyze how zero-
rating impacts the market when ISPs, CPs, and consumers
each choose options that maximize their individual rewards.
Our model differentiates CPs in terms of their value, i.e.,
how much revenue a CP makes per bandwidth unit used
by their customers. While incumbents typically have higher
values, startups would have lower values, making less money
per unit of bandwidth due to their smaller size and smaller
market popularity. While our model and theoretical results are
general for any kind of differential pricing, in this paper we
tailor our analysis explicitly to the zero-rating context, as it is
the only prevalent real-world implementation of late.
The new knowledge can help providers make informed zero-
rating decisions and guide regulators to design better policies
to address net neutrality issues from an interconnection con-
text. Our contributions and conclusions are as follows.
• We consider both ISPs’ and CPs’ zero-rating decisions
as a bargaining problem, analyze their strategic behavior,
and introduce the concept of zero-rating equilibria.
• We identify the phenomenon of zero-rating pressure
where CPs only zero-rate because their competitors do,
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and find how it impacts CPs’ decisions and their utilities.
• We analyze the impact of zero-rating on the market of
CPs both globally by analyzing the Herfindahl index [11],
and individually by analyzing CPs’ utilities. The Herfind-
ahl index analysis shows that zero-rating availability in a
heterogeneous market of CPs increases market distortion
by decreasing competition. Our utility analysis demon-
strates that zero-rating will mostly negatively impact the
utility of low-value CPs and positively impacts the utility
of high-value CPs.
• We numerically explore the parameter space of our model
and demonstrate the impact of zero-rating on market
shares and profitability of the CPs under varying market
conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we build our choice model which takes ISPs and CPs
as complementary services and characterizes their market
shares (Equation 2). In Section III we build our utility model
(Equation 4) under various zero-rating and market structures.
Section IV theoretically analyzes the Herfindahl index and
utilities under zero-rating equilibria, and in Section V we
numerically and qualitatively measures the Herfindahl index
and CPs’ utilities after identifying zero-rating equilibria in a
duopolistic market of ISPs/CPs. In Section VI we present the
related work, and finally the paper is concluded in Section
VII.
II. MODEL
We consider a setting with 3 types of players: user, ISP, and
CP. To receive content, a user must select one of |M| ISPs as
their bandwidth provider and can choose from one or more of
the |N| CPs from which the content is derived 1. For example,
a user may select AT&T as their ISP, and select Netflix, HBO,
and Facebook as their CPs. Generally, a user pays its ISP for
bandwidth, and the CP may also pay the ISP to deliver its
content to users. Furthermore, a CP’s income could come from
a subscription fee the user pays them monthly, advertisement
services, etc. In our analysis, we compute each CP’s income
based on the bandwidth unit of data consumed from it. For
instance, if an average user consumes 10 GB of data per month
from a given CP, and the CP makes $10 per month on average
from each user, the CP’s per-bandwidth unit income would be
1 /GB. Such payments are the basis of a zero-rating service,
based on which we develop our model through a sequence of
steps explained in the following subsections.
A. Dummy ISP and CP
In some cases, there exist users who may not choose any
ISPs, and/or may not choose any CPs. For instance, users who
select an ISP but no CP represent the ones who utilize Internet
access but do not pay for any premium services like Netflix or
HBO. Users who select CPs but no ISP are users who receive
1Note that the ISP’s side of the market can be easily extended to a model
where users may have multiple ISPs at a time, similar to the way CP’s side
is modeled. However, since it is a realistic scenario where each customer has
one ISP and multiple CPs, we set that as the basis of our model.
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Figure 1. The ISP-CP relations in a market of two real CPs and one real
ISP, where we assume there also exist one dummy ISP, one dummy CP, and
another auxiliary CP. Each user can choose one ISP j ∈ M and one CP
i ∈ N , and will be assigned to edge (i, j) accordingly.
a premium service via another means, e.g., Netflix by DVD
through mail. Users who select no ISP and no CP are those
users who require neither of these services. Furthermore, some
users may utilize multiple CPs at a time. In other words, each
user may choose a combination of the existing CPs with a
certain probability.
To facilitate subsequent analysis, rather than having users
who opt to select no ISP or no CP (or neither), we assume
the existence of a dummy CP and dummy ISP. Users who
would normally select no ISP (CP) can be mapped to a setting
where they select the dummy ISP (CP) at no cost. Note that
the dummy ISP carries no traffic and the dummy CP has no
content to offer.
A user, therefore, has a choice of |M| = |M| + 1 ISPs,
including the dummy ISP, and can choose one of |N | = 2|N|
possible subsets of CPs for their content, including the null set,
which corresponds to the dummy CP. We refer to the subset
of CPs chosen by the user as auxiliary CPs and denote the set
of ISPs and CPs (including dummies and auxiliaries) by M
and N , respectively. Thus, a user always picks an ISP from
M for her Internet access and one auxiliary CP from N for
the content.
Figure 1 illustrates the case where the market originally
has |N| = 2 CPs and |M| = 1 ISP. We model the market by
including the dummy ISP and auxiliary CPs, where we have
|N | = 2|N| = 4 and |M| = |M| + 1 = 2. Note that the
relationship between CPs and ISPs is illustrated in a complete
bipartite graph, where the users are assigned to different edges.
More specifically, if a user accesses CP 1 through ISP 1, she
will be assigned to the edge connecting i = 1 to j = 1.
If a user chooses ISP 1 as her provider and both CP 1 and
CP 2, she will be assigned to the edge connecting i = 3 to
j = 1. Each user can be assigned to one and only one edge,
therefore, the number of customers assigned to different edges
should sum up to the total market size.
B. Zero-Rating
In a paradigm where zero-rating is permitted, an ISP and a
CP may agree that instead of the user, the CP will cover the
bandwidth cost of the content viewed by the user, potentially at
a price lower than what the user would pay. A user’s choice
of ISPs and CPs could depend upon whether zero-rating is
permitted and offered by an ISP-CP pair as a service.
We assume customers are mapped to an ISP-CP pair (i, j)
according to a pre-determined distribution. However, the dis-
tribution is affected by zero-rating choices: when ISP j and
CP i decide to zero-rate, the probability of customers being as-
signed to them changes. We denote the zero-rating relationship
between CP i ∈ N and ISP j ∈ M by θij ∈ {0, 1}, where
θij = 1 indicates zero-rating between i and j is established,
otherwise θij = 0.
Even though zero-rating does not apply to the dummy CP
i = 0 or ISP j = 0, we always assume θ0j = θi0 = 0; ∀i ∈
N , j ∈ M. In dummy providers, zero-rating is an abstract
term, and as we will see in Section II-D, these providers
are always assumed not to have any zero-ratings, and they
capture some elastic users of the market in case no actual
provider zero-rates, as well as their own sticky users. Different
from dummy providers, zero-rating relation can be extended
to auxiliary CPs. Since an auxiliary CP is a subset of actual
CPs, it is assumed to have zero-rating relation with a given
ISP j if and only if all the CPs comprising it zero-rate with the
ISP. For instance, in Figure 1 the auxiliary CP 3 is assumed
to have a zero-rating relation with ISP 1 if and only if both
CP 1 and CP 2 have a zero-rating relation with ISP 1, i.e.,
θ31 = 1 ⇐⇒ θ11 = 1 & θ21 = 1.
C. Complementary Choices Model (N ,M)
We denote the baseline market share of ISP j by ψj ∈ (0, 1],
which captures the intrinsic characteristics such as price and
brand name, and models the market share of ISP j when none
of ISPs in the system have zero-rating relationships with the
CPs. In that case, the percentage ψj of each CP i’s users will
choose ISP j from the set M of ISPs. In probabilistic choice
models [12], ψj can also be interpreted as the probability that
any user chooses ISP j where none of ISPs offer zero-rating,
and we have
∑
j∈M ψj = 1. Furthermore, we denote the
baseline market share of CP i by φi ∈ (0, 1], i.e., the market
share of CP i when none of CPs zero-rate with the ISPs, and
we have
∑
i∈N φi = 1.
We define ψ , (ψ1, · · · , ψ|M|)T and φ ,
(φ1, · · · , φ|N |)T . Similarly, we have θi , (θi1, · · · , θiM )
and ϑj , (θ1j , · · · , θNj) as the zero-rating profile of CP i
and ISP j, respectively. The zero-rating matrix of the whole
system is defined as Θ , {θij : i ∈ N , j ∈M}. Given any
zero-rating strategy Θ, we denote the strategies of all pairs of
providers other than CP i and ISP j by Θ−ij .
We define α to be the fraction of elastic users of the
market who choose among the CPs and ISPs with zero-rating
relations, and if no such providers exist, these users would be
distributed among all the providers. The rest of the users are
distributed among CPs and ISPs merely based on their baseline
market shares and independent of the zero-rating relations.
These users are referred to as non-elastic, or sticky users, who
comprise 1−α fraction of the market. Note that the sticky users
do not move among the providers if their zero-rating relations
change, while elastic users do.
In practice, users may choose services from constrained sets
of CPs and ISPs. It might be because certain providers are not
parameter description
(i, j) a pair of CP i and ISP j
N , M set of all CPs, ISPs (including auxiliary)
N, M set of actual CPs, ISPs
θij zero-rating relation between (i, j)
Xij #users of (i, j); i ∈ N , j ∈M
Xij the effective #users of (i, j); i ∈ N, j ∈ M
α user elasticity
c bandwidth usage coefficient for non-zero-rated data
qi per bandwidth revenue of CP i; i ∈ N
pj per bandwidth price of ISP j; j ∈ M
φi baseline market share of CP i; i ∈ N
ψj baseline market share of ISP j; j ∈M
δj price discount of ISP j; j ∈ M
Ui, Rj utility of CP i, ISP j; i ∈ N, j ∈ M
Table I
SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF PARAMETERS.
available to the users or cannot satisfy their requirements. In
general, we denote a set of choice pairs by L. This set of
available choices is impacted by zero-rating relations in the
system, i.e., Θ. If CP i stops the zero-rating relationship with
ISP j such that the bandwidth costs for their services on that
ISP is no longer zero, their users might switch to an alternative
ISP and/or CP in the market.
Assumption 1. The set L for sticky users is the entire choice
set N ×M . The set L for elastic users is any pair of CP i
and ISP j who have zero-rating relations with one another,
and if there is no such pair, it would be the entire choice set
N ×M .
Assumption 1 states that elastic users of the market only
choose among pairs of CP-ISP which have zero-rating rela-
tions (if such pairs exist, otherwise, they choose among all
CP-ISP pairs), since they want to maximize their surplus.
However, since the sticky users in the market are not impacted
by zero-rating relations, they are distributed among all ISPs
and CPs based on their baseline market shares. In other words,
they stay with their initial providers regardless of Θ.
Based on the baseline market shares of the providers, we
make the following assumption on the users’ choices.
Assumption 2. Given a nonempty set L of available choices, a
user chooses a choice pair (i, j) ∈ L with probability
PL {(i, j)} = φiψj∑
(n,m)∈L φnψm
(1)
Under Assumption 2, if L equals the choice set N ×M , the
probability of choosing (i, j) equals φiψj , which is consistent
with our notion of baseline market shares. Furthermore, by
Luce’s choice axiom [13], the proportional form in (1) is also
necessary for guaranteeing an independence from irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) property: the probability of selecting one
item over another from a pool of many items is not affected
by the presence or absence of other items in the pool.
D. User Model
Our complementary choices model (N ,M) can be entirely
specified by a triple of vectors (φ,ψ,Θ) and the scalar α. We
denote the total market size by X . Based on Assumptions 1
and 2, we characterize the number of users of (i, j), denoted
by Xij , as a function of the zero-rating matrix Θ of the system
as Xij(Θ) = ρij(Θ)X , where ρij is the closed form market
share of the pair (i, j) and we have:
ρij(Θ) = (
φiψjθij∑
i′
∑
j′ φi′ψj′θi′j′
α+ φiψj(1− α))1{Θ6=0}
+ (φiψj)1{Θ=0} (2)
Equation 2 derives the number of users Xij for any pair
(i, j) of complementary providers under the zero-rating profile
Θ. In particular, Xij can be represented by the number of users
in the system X multiplied by the closed form market share
ρij(Θ), which is a function of the zero-rating profile Θ, the
baseline market shares, and the elasticity of the users. If CP
i and ISP j do not zero-rate, i.e., θij = 0, the pair (i, j) of
providers can keep the proportion 1−α of sticky users, who are
distributed in the system based on baseline market shares. On
the other hand, if CP i zero-rates with ISP j, i.e., θij = 1, not
only they will keep the proportion 1−α of their sticky users,
but also the elastic users in the market would have incentives to
choose them. Since elastic users of the market are distributed
among the providers who offer zero-rating, α fraction of users
would choose this pair with probability proportional to their
baseline market shares. If none of the CPs and ISPs have
zero-rating relations, all users are again distributed among the
providers based on their baseline market shares.
Lemma 1. Let N ′ ⊆ N and M′ ⊆ M. For any n /∈ N and
m /∈ M, let N˜ , N\N ′ ∪ {n} and M˜ , M\M′ ∪ {m}
denote the new sets of providers where the subsets N ′ and
M′ are replaced by the providers n and m, respectively. Let
X˜ij denote the number of users of (i, j) under (N˜ ,M˜). If
θi = θn, ∀i ∈ N ′, ϑj = ϑm, ∀j ∈ M′, and (φn, ψm) =(∑
i∈N ′ φi,
∑
j∈M′ ψj
)
, then
X˜nm =
∑
i∈N ′
∑
j∈M′
Xij ; X˜ij = Xij , ∀i 6= n, j 6= m;
X˜nj =
∑
i∈N ′
Xij , ∀j 6= m; and X˜im =
∑
j∈M′
Xij , ∀i 6= n.
Lemma 1 states that if there exists multiple CPs (or ISPs)
that use the same zero-rating profile, then they could be
conceptually merged as a single CP (or ISP) without affecting
the market shares of other providers.
When the users choose multiple CPs at the same time, they
contribute to the revenues of all CPs they use, as well as the
ISP they are assigned to. Let’s assume that the set of CPs who
are comprised from the actual CP i is shown by AUX(i).
For instance, in Figure 1, we have: AUX(1) = {1, 3}, and
AUX(2) = {2, 3}. Therefore, the effective number of users
who utilize the pair of and actual CP i and ISP j can be
computed from Equation 3.
Xij =
∑
i∈AUX(i)
Xij (3)
Corollary 1. When all the providers N×M−{(i, j)} have fixed
strategies, i.e., Θ−ij is fixed, zero-rating (i, j), i.e., changing
θij from 0 to 1, always helps CP i to attract more customers.
Based on Equation 2, in case CP i zero-rates with ISP j,
since θij = 1, as the first term of the equation is a positive
value, it causes Xij to increase, which then increases Xij
based on Equation 3.
III. UTILITY AND ZERO-RATING EQUILIBRIA
Pricing takes various forms for the Internet in practice.
Wireline ISPs often charge flat-rates [14], while tiered schemes
have recently been adopted by major U.S. broadband providers
such as Verizon [15] and AT&T [16]. Internet transit services,
however, are usually charged based on peak rates, e.g., the
95th percentile measurement [17]. Although data pricing may
take various forms, we assume each ISP and CP choose
whether or not to adopt zero-rating between each other for
their customers.
Although the data prices and values are assumed to be
exogenous, each ISP j has the option of charging a different
data price δjpj from CPs in case they have zero-rating relation,
where 0 < δj ≤ 1 denotes the data price discount ISP j offers
to the CPs. If δj < 1, CPs can purchase ISP j’s bandwidth
as a zero-rated service, with a lower price than the users can
directly purchase it. Even though in this case ISP j loses per
bandwidth unit income, its total revenue may increase since
it could attract a higher number of customers. However, a
low value of δj could harm ISP j’s total revenue. We define
δ , (δ1, · · · , δ|M|)T to denote the entire ISP discount profile
of the market.
In this section, we analyze ISPs’ and CPs’ zero-rating
decisions. Note that although the auxiliary providers do not
make independent zero-rating decisions, we account for their
users in our evaluations because their users contribute to
the users of actual providers (Equation 3), and therefore to
their utilities. However, the users of dummy providers do
not generate any utilities. We first introduce the following
assumption to compute the utility model of the actual providers
in the market.
Assumption 3. The revenue of ISP j ∈ M from the market of
CPs is equal to the summation of revenues each CP i’s user
brings to j for all i ∈ N. Likewise, the utility of each actual
CP i ∈ N is equal to the summation of utility each ISP j’s
user brings to i for all j ∈M.
Note that even though the utility is a general term, it can
also model the benefit a player gains in an abstract form. Since
unlike ISPs, each CP’s income has an indirect relationship
with the bandwidth usage, we use the term utility to model its
decision-making process. Whereas to avoid confusion, we use
the term revenue to address the same thing for ISPs.
Assumption 4. When zero-rating is provided for a pair of CP
i and ISP j, i.e., θij = 1, since users would not pay the
bandwidth price, their average bandwidth usage may increase
by a factor of 1/c, where 0 < c ≤ 1.
When the bandwidth usage increases in case of zero-rating,
the utilities of CPs and the revenues of ISPs who zero-rate
will also increase since they are a function of per-bandwidth
unit prices. To model this phenomenon, instead of assuming
the utilities and revenues of providers who zero-rate increase
by a factor 1/c ≥ 1, for simplicity we assume if the providers
cancel their zero-rating, their utilities and revenues decreases
by a factor of c, where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 and it is called bandwidth
usage coefficient. Note that our model is not designed to
capture bandwidth saturation for the ISPs, assuming ISPs to
be smart agents with mechanisms to provide the bandwidth
requested by the users, and in case of zero-rating the CPs will
pay for ISPs’ bandwidth.
Using Assumptions 3 and 4, and given any zero-rating
strategy profile Θ, we denote the utility of CP i by Ui(Θ)
and the revenue of ISP j by Rj(Θ) and define them as
Ui(Θ) ,
∑
j∈M
U ji (Θ) and Rj(Θ) ,
∑
i∈N
Rij(Θ),
where U ji (Θ) ,
{
qiXij(Θ).c if θij = 0,
(qi − δjpj)Xij(Θ) if θij = 1.
,
and Rij(Θ) ,
{
pjXij(Θ).c if θij = 0,
δjpjXij(Θ) if θij = 1.
(4)
Each CP i’s utility is the sum over the utilities U ji generated
from each ISP j, which equals to the effective number of
users Xij(Θ) multiplied by either its profit margin qi − δjpj
if zero-rating is provided, or its original value qi otherwise.
Similarly, each ISP j’s revenue is the sum over the revenues Rij
generated from each CP i, which equals the effective number
of users Xij(Θ) multiplied by either its price pj if zero-rating
is not provided, or by the weighted value of δjpj otherwise.
Note that the utility functions of auxiliary CPs are not well-
defined since their users are being counted as effective users
of the actual CPs they encompass, and the users of dummy
providers do not generate any utility.
CPs’ zero-rating decisions depend on the prices imposed
by ISPs, i.e., δjpj for ISP j. ISPs’ decisions depend on
the revenue they receive from CPs via zero-rating compared
to what they would receive from users directly. Equation 2
and 3 show that CP i’s utility Ui(Θ) depends not only on
its own strategy θij , but also on all other CPs’ and ISPs’
relations Θ−ij . We assume that given the price profile p,
ISPs make simultaneous zero-rating offers with deciding a
discount profile δ to maximize their revenues, and CPs make
simultaneous decisions whether or not to adopt them. We
define a zero-rating equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1 (Zero-rating Equilibrium). In a market of ISPs
and CPs, given fixed discount and price profiles, a zero-rating
strategy profile is a zero-rating equilibrium (ZRE) if and only
if 1) given a zero-rating strategy Θ chosen by ISPs, neither of
CPs would gain by unilaterally deviating from Θ 2) given a
zero-rating strategy Θ chosen by CPs, neither of ISPs would
gain by unilaterally deviating from Θ.
Based on Definition 1, if Θ is a ZRE, for each actual
CP i and ISP j we have Ui(θij ; Θ−ij) ≥ Ui(θ¯ij ; Θ−ij) and
Rj(θij ; Θ−ij) ≥ Rj(θ¯ij ; Θ−ij).
ZRE is a specific kind of Nash equilibrium [18], where there
exist two groups of inter-dependent players. Since zero-rating
is a bilateral contract between ISPs and CPs, the zero-rating
decision which is affected by the entire market resembles a
bargaining problem. For instance, given a pair of ISP-CP, the
CP (ISP) does not have the option of establishing zero-rating
if the ISP (CP) is not willing to zero-rate. Therefore, we use
the term ZRE to avoid confusion. ZRE is evaluated for a pure
strategy game since mixed strategy decisions between CP i
and ISP j to zero-rate do not apply to real-world scenarios,
and users need deterministic knowledge on which ISP-CPs
offer zero-rating.
In some ISP prices, although ZRE is where a CP i zero-
rates, it may face a utility drop compared to the case where no
zero-rating is allowed in the market, i.e., Θ = 0. In this case,
if CP i deviates, it loses customers to the CPs who zero-rate
and its utility further drops. This scenario resembles prisoner’s
dilemma paradox in [19], where each player chooses to protect
themselves at the expense of the other participant and as a
result, the optimal outcome will not be produced. However,
since the market of CPs is mostly heterogeneous, this scenario
mainly harms the low-value CPs rather than high-value ones
as we see in Section IV-B. We define zero-rating pressure to
address this phenomenon.
Definition 2 (Zero-rating Pressure). Zero-rating pressure hap-
pens when a CP decides to zero-rate to avoid losing cus-
tomers; only because another CP is zero-rating with the
same or different ISP, and if the latter cancels its zero-rating
relation, the former would not zero-rate.
Suppose there are two heterogeneous CPs in the market,
and in ZRE the CP with a lower value zero-rates with an
ISP. In that case, its utility shall improve compared to when
it does not zero-rate. If zero-rating increases low-value CP’s
utility, the same must be true for the high-value CP as well.
We introduce Lemma 2 to generalize this case.
Lemma 2. In a market N of content providers with different
values, suppose i, i′ ∈ N and qi < qi′ . The zero-rating strategy
that CP i zero-rates with ISP j while CP i′ does not is never
a ZRE.
A more rigorous proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix
I, which will be used in the next section to analyze how zero-
rating impacts the market as a whole, and its components as
individuals.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we represent a macroscopic and microscopic
analysis of the impact of zero-rating on the market of CPs.
For the former, we evaluate the Herfindahl index [11] of the
market, which is a proxy of competitiveness in the entire
market and looks at the CPs as a whole. For the latter, we
look into individual CPs’ utilities.
A. Herfindahl Index Analysis
To show the impact of zero-rating on the market, we
compute the Herfindahl index [11], also known as Herfindahl-
Hirschman index or HHI, for different ISP prices among
CPs. This index is calculated as the sum of squares over
the market shares of all firms in the market, and since it
accounts for the number of firms and concentration, it is
an indicator of competition among firms. When this index
grows to 1, the market moves from a collaborative state to a
monopolistic content provider, i.e., the competition decreases.
Lack of competition in the market causes market distortion and
significant welfare loss due to monopoly [20]. HHI increases
of over 0.01 generally provoke scrutiny, although this varies
from case to case [21].
In this section, we analyze a market of CPs with different
values and show how the availability of zero-rating would
impact the Herfindahl index in the market. The analysis of
this section is based on the user model in Equation 2, and
since we draw the conclusions theoretically, they are general
to our model and are independent of parameter choices. The
detailed proof of the lemmas in this section are present in
Appendix I.
Lemma 3. In the market N of content providers, the Herfindahl
index increases when the variance of content providers’ market
shares increases.
Based on Lemma 3, the more different the market shares of
CPs are, the higher the Herfindahl index would be. Intuitively,
a high variance between the market shares indicates that the
market is moving towards a monopoly, where the increase in
the Herfindahl index confirms that as well.
Lemma 4. The Herfindahl index is the same if none of the CPs
zero-rate versus if every CP in the market zero-rates.
The amount of consumption may increase in case every
CP zero-rates in the market compared to when no one zero-
rates. Furthermore, if everyone zero-rates the elastic users with
dummy CP would be utilizing an actual CP. However, the
relative market share of CPs remains unchanged (see Appendix
I for proof). Therefore, the Herfindahl index stays the same in
both cases.
Theorem 1. In a market N of content providers with values
{q1, q2, ..., q|N|}, suppose q1 ≤ q2 ≤ ... ≤ q|N|, and the content
providers with higher values also have higher baseline market
shares, i.e., φ1 ≤ φ2 ≤ ... ≤ φ|N|. If at least one of these
inequalities is strict, zero-rating options in the market will
cause the Herfindahl index to be non-decreasing in all possible
ZRE.
Based on Lemma 4, when zero-rating is available in the
market, in case ZRE consists of either every CP or no CP zero-
rate, the Herfindahl index stays the same. In other ZRE cases,
if CPs with higher values and higher baseline market shares
afford more zero-ratings than their low-value opponents, the
Herfindahl index will increase (proof in Appendix I). This
could represent the case where startups with low incomes and
low initial baseline market shares join the market of CPs. The
increase in the Herfindahl index implies that the market moves
toward monopoly, where the startups would not survive.
The correctness of Theorem 1 is based on Lemma 4 which
uses the relative market shares (see Appendix I). However,
since the same conclusion cannot be driven for CPs’ utilities
as the actual number of users matters rather than the relative
number of users, in the next section, we numerically analyze
the utilities of CPs and observe the impact of different param-
eters on ZRE.
B. Utility Analysis
Computing the utility for each content provider requires
prior knowledge of the ZRE strategies. Note that for a two-
player game (or more), neither existence nor uniqueness of
Nash equilibria could be guaranteed; it is NP-complete to
determine whether the Nash equilibria with certain natural
properties exist [22] and it is #P-hard to count the Nash
equilibria [23]. However, in a heterogeneous market of CPs
with different values, based on Lemma 2, there are a limited
number of zero-rating strategies that could become an equilib-
rium, i.e., the case where a low-value CP zero-rates with an
ISP, while another CP with higher value does not, is never an
equilibrium while the opposite can be. We focus on how zero-
rating impacts CPs with different values, where incumbents
and startups could be thought of as CPs with high and low
values, respectively. We introduce Theorem 2 to address the
special case where the low-value CP cannot afford to zero-rate
in the equilibria, while the high-value CP can.
Theorem 2. In a market of CPs with |N| ≥ 2, let CP 1 have a
lower value than CP 2. If the low-value CP does not zero-rate
with any ISP (θ1j = 0 ∀j ∈M) while the high-value CP does
(θ2j = 1 ∃j ∈M), and the zero-rating strategy profile for the
rest of CPs (other than CP 1 and CP 2) does not change, the
utility of low-value CP 1 will always decrease compared with
when zero-rating is not available, while the utility of high-
value CP 2 increases or remains the same.
Since utility analysis, in general, depends on the exact
zero-rating strategies of the market after equilibria, which are
not possible to be determined in a closed-form formula, we
perform numerical evaluations to illustrate the impact of zero-
rating on the CPs in next section.
V. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
In this section, we use our model to evaluate and analyze
the zero-rating equilibria for a market with complementary
duopoly, i.e., |M| = |N| = 2, where two CPs and two ISPs
compete on both sides of the market. We assume that we
have the regulation of weak content provider net neutrality
[4], meaning that each ISP charges the same price from every
CP. For the simplicity of the result illustration, we also assume
that ISPs’ price discount profile δ = 1. Therefore, the ISPs
charge the same price from the CPs in case of zero-rating
as they would charge the users otherwise. In Appendix II, we
have analyzed a case where ISPs get to decide on the discount
profile δ and have shown how it would impact the market
under ZRE.
As Lemma 1 shows that providers with similar prices and
zero-rating strategies can be merged, a duopolistic model
provides a first-order approximation of market competitions
from a provider’s perspective such that all its competitors
are considered as an aggregated provider that captures the
remaining market share. We assume the elasticity of the users,
baseline market shares, and prices are exogenous. Note that
this evaluation can be extended to different parameter choices
and is not prone to parameter selection. However, to determine
these parameters in a real-world market, the reader may refer
to some previous work that study the impact of zero-rating on
mobile Internet usage and have been reviewed in Section VI.
We use a general model and synthetically set the parameters to
show how the market behaves under different conditions, and
we show parameter selection does not qualitatively change
our results. All prices and revenues in our evaluation are
normalized to 1 and are not intended to reflect absolute real-
world values, rather the relative differences between ISPs and
CPs.
We compare two different hypothetical markets, one where
zero-rating options are not allowed, the other one where zero-
rating options are allowed and available, and ISPs and CPs
decide on their zero-rating strategies where the market could
reach the equilibria. If multiple ZRE exist, we make an
arbitrary choice to illustrate only one ZRE with the maximum
number of zero-rated relations, and in case of a tie, the high
value CP (in our case CP 2) and ISP 2 will have the maximum
number of zero-rated relations. If no ZRE exists, we assume
the market-share and utility of CPs remain the same as if there
are no zero-rating options allowed in the market. We show how
the zero-rating strategies are made and hence how HHI and
the utilities of CPs are different in these two markets.
1) Benchmark Scenario: We use a benchmark scenario in
which c = 0.5, α = 0.5, and δ = 1. We also have φ =
(0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), and ψ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4), where assuming
the vector indices start from 0, φ0 is the baseline market share
of dummy CP, i.e., the fraction of users who do not use any
CPs, φ3 is the baseline fraction of customers who use both
CP 1 and CP 2, and φ1 and φ2 are the baseline market shares
of CP 1 and CP 2, respectively. Similarly, ψ0 is the baseline
market share of dummy ISP, and ψ1, and ψ2 are the baseline
market shares of ISP 1 and ISP 2, respectively. Without loss
of generality, we assume q1 ≤ q2 and normalize the prices
such that q ≤ 1 and p ≤ 1.
Figure 2 visualizes the ZRE when ISPs’ prices p1 and p2
vary along the x- and y-axis, respectively. Based on Lemma
2 as q2 > q1, 9 of the 16 possible zero-rating profiles could
become ZRE under various ISP prices, which are shown in
the right sub-figure as legends. The case where ISP j has the
price of 0 can represent when it offers an unlimited plan, and
we assume in that case it is always zero-rating with all the CPs
in the market. Intuitively, when ISP prices are low, both CPs
are willing to zero-rate; but when the prices are high, neither
Figure 2. ZRE map under complementary duopoly with α = 0.5, c = 0.5,
δ = (1.0, 1.0), φ = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), and ψ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4). Shaded
areas in blue (\) and red (/) represent zero-rating pressure for CP 1 and CP
2, respectively.
CP is willing to do so. Low-value CP 1 is generally more
susceptible to ISP price changes; we observe that under any
fixed price pj¯ as pj increases, CP 1 first cancels its zero-rating
with ISP j, followed by CP 2.
Figure 2 also illustrates the regions of zero-rating pressure
for CPs. The shaded blue regions demonstrate when CP 1 zero-
rates under pressure, and the shaded red regions demonstrate
when CP 2 does so. Zero-rating pressure for high-value CP
happens when the low-value CP establishes zero-rating with
the cheaper ISP, the high-value CP as a response establishes a
zero-rating relation with the more expensive ISP to maintain
its customers. However, any zero-rating of the high-value CP
can cause zero-rating pressure for the low-value CP, if it is
not originally willing to zero-rate.
Figure 3 visualizes the impact of zero-rating on the CPs’
utilities and the market HHI. We observe that in an imbalanced
market of CPs, zero-rating usually decreases the utility of low-
value CP 1, but increases the utility of high-value CP 2. Based
on Lemma 2 (and Figure 2), high-value CP 2 always can
afford more zero-rating relations than low-value CP 1. Hence
its utility mostly increases as it attracts more elastic users of
the market. This figure also confirms Theorem 2, where in
case CP 1 does not have any zero-rating relations while CP
2 does, CP 1’s utility always decreases while CP 2’s utility
does not. In Figure 3(c), we observe how HHI changes after
ZRE as opposed to when it is not allowed, which is always
non-decreasing in accordance to Theorem 1.
In the following subsections, with our focus on the market
of CPs, we show how the changes in each parameter impact
ZRE strategies, CPs’ utilities, and HHI.
2) Impact of Bandwidth Usage Coefficient: To show how
a decrease/increase of bandwidth usage during zero-rating
impacts the market, we have varied the parameter c and
observed the equilibria, utilities, and HHI in the market. Since
our benchmark analysis in Figure 2 has c = 0.5, we test our
model with both a higher and a lower value of c.
Figure 4(a, e) illustrates the impact of c on ZRE. When
c decreases from 0.5 in figure 2 to 0.2 in Figure 4(a), the
number of zero-rated relations increases as well since cancel-
ing zero-rating causes less bandwidth usage which produces
less income for both CPs and ISPs. However, when c = 0.8
in Figure 4(e), canceling zero-rating would not decrease the
(a) CP 1’s utility changes (b) CP 2’s utility changes (c) HHI changes
Figure 3. the differences in CPs’ utilities when zero-rating is available and the market reaches equilibria, minus when zero-rating is not available. We have:
α = 0.5, c = 0.5, φ = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), ψ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4), δ = (1.0, 1.0) and q = (0.4, 1.0).
bandwidth usage as much as when c = 0.5. Hence, the number
of zero-rated relations decreases. The regions of zero-rating
pressure for low-value CP 1 also increase since as CP 1’s
incentives to zero-rate decrease, it is not willing to zero-rate
unless its competitor is doing so, which is the definition of
zero-rating pressure. Note that in Figure 4(e), there is no ZRE
when p ∈ {(0.3, 0.3), (0.3, 0.4), (04, 0.3)}. In these regions,
when CP 2 zero-rates with an ISP, the best decision for CP
1 would be to zero-rate as well. But if CP 1 zero-rates, CP
2 would cancel its zero-rating. As a response, CP 1 would
cancel its zero-rating as well, for which the best decision of
CP 2 would be to zero-rate. Therefore, there is an infinite loop
where the market does not reach to any ZRE. Note that utility
and HHI changes in these regions are assumed to be zero.
Figure 4 also depicts the utility and HHI changes corre-
sponding to 4(a, d). We observe that when c = 0.2, both CPs
may experience an increase in their utilities, which is more
major for high-value CP 2. Note that in regions where CP 2 is
the only one who zero-rates, as shown in Theorem 2, CP 1’s
utility decreases, although it might not be observable in the
graphs. However, when c = 0.8, low-value CP 1 experiences
a more major utility loss, whereas the utility of CP 2 may
slightly increase or decrease. We also observe that HHI in
both cases increases as expected by Theorem 1.
Note that when CP 1 does not zero-rate but CP 2 does,
the utility difference between ZRE and when no zero-rating
is allowed is smaller for CP 1 when c = 0.8 compared to the
benchmark (c = 0.5) and c = 0.2. When CP 1 does not zero-
rate but CP 2 does, for all values of c the utility difference
for CP 1 is negative. However, based on Equation 4, since
the utility of CP 1 with no zero-ratings is multiplied by c, the
larger c is, the smaller this negative number would be after
multiplication.
Takeaways: When the bandwidth usage coefficient (c) is
small, both CPs experience utility gain after zero-rating, where
this gain is higher for the high-value CP. When c is in the mid-
range (c = 0.5), low-value CP primarily experiences utility
loss, while high-value CP experiences utility gain. For high
values of c (c = 0.8), the utility loss for low-value CP is more
major, while the utility gain for high-value CP is smaller.
3) Impact of User Elasticity: To observe how the elasticity
of the users impacts the market decisions, we have simulated
the market equilibria for α = 0.2 and α = 0.8, which are
lower and higher than the benchmark α = 0.5, respectively.
Figure 5(a, e) depicts the impact of α on the equilibria. As
the user elasticity increases, the providers are more inclined
toward zero-rating since they can attract the elastic users of
the market and increase their utilities. We observe that the
regions of zero-rating pressure increase as well with the user
elasticity, because in some ISP prices where only one CP is
willing to zero-rate under any Θ, if the other CP does not it
would lose more customers due to high elasticity.
Figure 5 also depicts the corresponding utility and HHI
changes corresponding to Figure 5(a, d). We observe that low-
value CP 1 mostly has utility loss as α increases. With higher
user elasticity, the number CP 1’s elastic users increases. Since
CP 1 is less likely to afford zero-rating compared to CP 2,
high-value CP 2 could attract elastic users if it is the only one
who zero-rates. As before, HHI remains increasing with is an
indication of the market moving towards a monopoly.
Takeaways: When user elasticity increases, it mostly harms
low-value CP during zero-rating, since the higher fraction of
its users would be elastic and would leave it when it does not
afford zero-rating.
4) Impact of Baseline Market Shares: To show the impact
of baseline market shares, φ and ψ, we vary the values of φ1
and φ2 for CP 1 and CP 2, and ψ1 and ψ2 for ISP 1 and ISP
2. In our benchmark simulation in Figure 2 and 3, we showed
how ZRE, utilities and HHI look when φ1 = φ2 and ψ1 = ψ2.
In this section, we evaluate our model for φ1 > φ2, φ1 < φ2,
ψ1 > ψ2, and ψ1 < ψ2.
Figure 6(a, e) illustrates the impact of CPs’ baseline market
shares on the equilibria. We observe that when the baseline
market share of the low-value (high-value) CP increases (de-
creases), the high-value CP is more willing to establish zero-
rating, as it wants to increase its small initial market share, and
since it has a high value, it can afford that when ISP prices
are not too high.
Figure 6 also shows the changes of CPs’ utilities and the
HHI corresponding to 6(a, d) when φ is being varied. We
observe that when low-value CP 1 is also the one with the
smaller market share, zero-rating being available causes its
utility to sometimes slightly decrease when CP 1 cannot afford
zero-rating while CP 2 can. Since this decrease is small, it
(a) ZRE, c = 0.2 (b) CP 1’s utility changes (c) CP 2’s utility changes (d) HHI changes
(e) ZRE, c = 0.8 (f) CP 1’s utility changes (g) CP 2’s utility changes (h) HHI changes
Figure 4. (a,d) ZRE under complementary duopoly. (b,c,e,f) The differences in CPs’ utilities when zero-rating is available and the market reaches equilibria,
minus when zero-rating is not available. We have: α = 0.5, φ = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), ψ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4), δ = (1.0, 1.0) and q = (0.4, 1.0).
might not be observable in Figure 6(b).
However, when low-value CP 1 has a higher market share
than high-value CP 2, it also will have more elastic customers.
When CP 2 establishes zero-rating relations it will attract
more customers from CP 1 and as a result, CP 1 will have
a major drop (the red regions in Figure 6(f)). The utility of
high-value CP 2 is generally increased compared to the case
where no zero-rating is allowed. Note that CP 1’s utility is
higher when its baseline market share is higher, but Figure 6
merely illustrates the difference in utilities when zero-rating
is available minus when it is not. This represents the only
scenario where zero-rating can potentially have some benefit
in terms of the Herfindahl index, as the introduction of zero-
rating increases the market share of the CP with the lower
baseline market share. Practically, this scenario translates to
a case where a CP that is making more profit per customer
has a lower initial market share, and it can directly increase
its market share by reducing its profitability to move closer
to the other CP. However, it is not clear that zero-rating is
needed to address the market share imbalance and hence long
term consumer benefit since it introduces a utility loss to the
low-value CP. In other words, even though the variations in
ISPs’ baseline market shares change the equilibria pattern, the
low-value CP would still usually have utility loss, whereas the
high-value CP would have utility gain.
Figure 7 shows the impact of ψ on the equilibria, CPs’
utilities, and HHI. From (a, d), we observe that CPs are
generally more willing to zero-rate with the ISP who has
a higher baseline market share to attract more customers,
and hence asymmetries are introduced to the graphs when
ψ1 6= ψ2. Therefore, compared to Figure 2, zero-rating
pressure happens in higher price ranges of the ISP who has
a smaller ψ since CP 1 is less willing to zero-rate with it
without CP 2 zero-rating. The highest utility drop for CP 1
mainly happens when CP 2 establishes more zero-ratings than
CP 1 while CP 2’s utility generally increases. Furthermore,
HHI in both cases are generally increasing.
Takeaways: As the baseline market share of low-value
CP increases (the baseline market share of high-value CP
decreases), zero-rating mostly harms low-value CP’s utility
compared to the case where it is not available. With zero-rating
available, high-value CP affords and has more incentives to
zero-rate, and may attract elastic customer of low-value CP. As
the baseline market shares of two ISPs become asymmetrical,
CPs are more willing to zero-rate with the ISP with higher
market share, where high-value CP affords to do so more than
its low-value competitor, resulting in utility gains for high-
value CP at the expense of utility loss for the low-value one.
Based on the utility analysis in this section, Table II
summarizes how different parameters impact CPs’ average
utilities and market shares over different ISP prices when
zero-rating is available versus when it is not. This average
is computed for all the graphs in this section, were the utility
and market share values for 121 points were recorded over
p1, p2 ∈ {0.0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.0}. We see that regardless of
parameter choice, aside from some exceptions, zero-rating
mostly favors the utility and market share of high-value CP 2,
while it harms the market share of low-value CP 1. Moreover,
even though CP 1’s average utility mostly increases, its utility
drops in a large ISP price range as well, and its gain is not
as major as CP 2’s average utility gain. As we saw in this
section, the utility gains for CP 1 mostly happen in low ISP
prices where both CPs afford to zero-rate. However, in higher
ISP prices where the competition increases and CP 2 is mostly
(a) ZRE, α = 0.2 (b) CP 1’s utility changes (c) CP 2’s utility changes (d) HHI changes
(e) ZRE, α = 0.8 (f) CP 1’s utility changes (g) CP 2’s utility changes (h) HHI changes
Figure 5. (a,d) ZRE under complementary duopoly. (b,c,e,f) The differences in CPs’ utilities when zero-rating is available and the market reaches equilibria,
minus when zero-rating is not available. We have: c = 0.5, φ = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), ψ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4), δ = (1.0, 1.0) and q = (0.4, 1.0).
the only CP who zero-rates, there is a big range where CP 1’s
utility drops.
VI. RELATED WORK
Cheng et al. [24] and Ma [25] consider the case where
CPs bargain with the monopolistic ISP to obtain exclusive
priority for their traffic; CPs are charged a fee only if they
opt for priority, and users can access one content provider
exclusively. While they both define a fixed market share for
CPs, Cheng et al. incorporate consumer surplus for a case of
monopolistic ISP and find that premium peering leaves content
providers worse off, but Ma assumes ISPs are always willing to
offer exclusive priorities, while CPs are the decision-makers.
In our work, we consider zero-rating decisions in the market
of multiple CPs and ISPs and study the case where customers
do not necessarily use exclusive CPs. We consider both CPs’
and ISPs’ zero-rating decisions and show that zero-rating may
cause market distortion by increasing the Herfindahl index
in the market of CPs, and usually leaves the low-value CP
(startups with low incomes) worse off.
Choi and Kim [3] analyze the effects of net neutrality reg-
ulations on investment incentives for ISPs and CPs. Reggiani
et al. [26] also model an Internet broadband provider that
can offer a priority to two different content providers, low-
value and high-value, and show that net neutrality regulations
effectively protect innovation done at the edge by small content
providers. Zhang et al. [27] builds a two-class service model
to analyze the consumers’ traffic demand under the sponsored
data plan with consideration of QoS, and characterize the
interaction between CPs and a monopolistic ISP. Wong et al.
Shirmali [28] considers surplus extraction by a monopolistic
ISP who controls the medium of information transfer between
application developers and consumers, and shows that net
neutrality is necessary to ensure maximal benefit to the society.
Wong et al. [29] formulate an analytical model of the user,
CP, and ISP interactions and derives their optimal behaviors.
They show that zero-rating disproportionately benefits less
cost-sensitive CPs and more cost-sensitive users, exacerbating
disparities among CPs. While the aforementioned models
consider a market of monopolistic ISP and duopolistic CPs
in which users access exclusively one content provider, our
model extends to a larger market of ISPs and CPs where users
are not required to access content providers exclusively.
Some previous studies focus on abolishing net neutrality
under zero-rating. For instance, the authors in [30], [31],
[32] analyze zero-rating incentives of a monopolistic ISP
in a homogeneous market of customers, and how different
zero-rating equilibria impacts social welfare. Somogyi et al.
[30] consider capacity constraints in a two-sided market with
advertising revenue for CPs. Jullien et al. [33] discuss the
elasticity of users and mainly focus on the case of a monopoly
network with inelastic participation of consumers. While they
all focus on a small monopolistic ISP market, we extend our
study to larger markets where our main focus is on how zero-
rating impacts innovations in the market and we do not analyze
the customers’ side in detail.
Some other work study real-word markets which have
established zero-rating. Mathur et al. [34] analyze network
usage data in South Africa and show that where usage-based
billing is prevalent and data costs are high, users are extremely
cost-conscious and are willing to use ISPs/CPs who have more
affordable costs. Using the Android app MySpeedTest [35],
they collect information on mobile data usage and find that
90% of users consumed twice as much data when they do
(a) ZRE,
φ = (0.1, 0.2, 0.6, 0.1)
(b) CP 1’s utility changes (c) CP 2’s utility changes (d) HHI changes
(e) ZRE,
φ = (0.1, 0.6, 0.2, 0.1)
(f) CP 1’s utility changes (g) CP 2’s utility changes (h) HHI changes
Figure 6. (a,d) ZRE under complementary duopoly. (b,c,e,f) The differences in CPs’ utilities when zero-rating is available and the market reaches equilibria,
minus when zero-rating is not available. We have: α = 0.5, c = 0.5, ψ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4), δ = (1.0, 1.0) and q = (0.4, 1.0).
Table II
IMPACT OF PARAMETERS ON CPS’ AVERAGE UTILITIES AFTER ZER COMPARED TO WHEN ZERO-RATING IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE AVERAGE IS TAKEN
OVER DIFFERENT ISP PRICES p1, p2 ∈ {0, 0.1, ..., 1.0}. BENCHMARK PARAMETERS ARE α = c = 0.5, φ = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), ψ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4),
δ = (1.0, 1.0) AND q = (0.4, 1.0).
parameter changes against benchmark low-value CP’s avg of high-value CP’s avg of
utility market share utility market share
benchmark parameters — ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
bandwidth usage coefficient decrease (c = 0.2) ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑increase (c = 0.8) ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
user elasticity decrease (α = 0.2) ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑increase (α = 0.8) ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
CPs’ baseline market shares
decrease low-value CP’s baseline ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
(φ = (0.1, 0.2, 0.6, 0.1))
increase low-value CP’s baseline ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
(φ = (0.1, 0.6, 0.2, 0.1))
ISPs’ baseline market shares
decrease ISP 1’s baseline ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
(ψ = (0.2, 0.2, 0.6))
increase ISP 1’s baseline ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
(ψ = (0.2, 0.6, 0.2))
not pay for ISP bandwidth compared to when they have a
usage-based mobile connection. Chen et al. [36] also collect a
dataset by MySpeedTest and by analyzing zero-rating What-
sApp on Cell-C’s network and zero-rating twitter on MTN’s
network, they find that zero-rating increases overall usage
of the WhatsApp on Cell-C and Twitter on MTN network
while it decreases it on most other providers. Valancius et
al. [37] also innovatively use existing data to determine some
unknown parameters such as the cost of various resources,
or how users respond to price. While in our work we use
synthetic parameters to test our model, our final results and
takeaways are not qualitatively impacted by parameter choice,
albeit our model is flexible to use real-world parameters as a
future direction.
VII. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper explores a controversial and unsettled aspect of
net neutrality by analyzing zero-rating decisions in a market of
multiple CPs and ISPs, and their impact on growing businesses
and incumbents. We model the zero-rating decisions as a bar-
gain between CPs and ISPs and find the zero-rating equilibria
resulted in the market. By mainly focusing on CP’s side of the
(a) ZRE,ψ = (0.2, 0.2, 0.6) (b) CP 1’s utility changes (c) CP 2’s utility changes (d) HHI changes
(e) ZRE,ψ = (0.2, 0.6, 0.2) (f) CP 1’s utility changes (g) CP 2’s utility changes (h) HHI changes
Figure 7. (a,d) ZRE under complementary duopoly. (b,c,e,f) The differences in CPs’ utilities when zero-rating is available and the market reaches equilibria,
minus when zero-rating is not available. We have: α = 0.5, c = 0.5, φ = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), δ = (1.0, 1.0) and q = (0.4, 1.0).
market and using the Herfindahl index, we have theoretically
shown the distortions in the market may increase when zero-
rating is available. We further numerically and qualitatively
analyze the impact of zero-rating on CPs with different values
and show that zero-rating typically disadvantages low-value
CPs and could stunt the innovations. Our results strongly
suggest that zero-rating can be harmful to competitiveness in
a market, especially when the players have asymmetric market
power and hence it should be disallowed under net neutrality.
We have taken into account the decision of ISPs to enhance
their market share, where there might be different factors that
impact ISPs’ revenue differently. First, compared to the data
prices ISPs charge users, they might offer a price discount to
CPs in case of zero-rating. Second, the bandwidth usage for
zero-rated data could be potentially more than that of paid
data. We consider the price of ISPs and the value of CPs as
the units of their utilities, and by assuming that customers are
probabilistically homogeneous, we analyze the market at both
a macroscopic and a microscopic level and depend on discrete
choice modeling. A future direction would be considering
different real-world markets that have been studied in the past
and tuning our parameters based on them.
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APPENDIX I
Proof of Lemma 1: The additivity property holds because the
users choose an ISP-CP pair based on the linear proportional
form of Assumption 2, which induces the market shares of
the providers in terms of linear functions in Equation 2. When
zero-rating profiles, i.e., θi or ϑj are similar, the closed-form
market share expressions keep the same form in terms of
ρij(Θ), while the baseline market shares of the providers, i.e.,
φi or ψj , are aggregated.
Proof of Lemma 2: If the content provider with the lower
value zero-rates, zero-rating must be a strategy to cause its
utility to increase. In that case, based on Equation 4, zero-
rating would increase the utility of the high-value CP as well
since every characteristic of them are similar, only the high-
value one has a higher q. In other words, if the low-value CP
can afford zero-rating, so does the high-value CP. However,
the opposite is not always true; if the high-value CP can afford
zero-rating, the low-value CP would not necessarily afford
it. Therefore, in the market of two CPs, possible zero-rating
equilibria are either only the high-value CP zero-rate, or both
zero-rate, or none zero-rates.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose Xi is the fraction of users
(market share) for CP i, and is equivalent to
∑
j∈(M) ρij when
the total market size X is normalized to 1. We have
HHI =
∑
i∈N
X2i
and
σ2 =
∑
i∈NX
2
i
|N| − µ
2
where the mean µ =
∑
i∈NXi
|N| =
1
|N|
Therefore, we have:
HHI =
1
|N| + σ
2|N|
Hence, the Herfindahl index has the minimum value of 1|N|
when the variance of market shares is zero, and it increases as
the variance increases. In a market of two content providers,
this index grows when the gap between their market shares
increases.
Proof of Lemma 4: Without loss of generality, suppose we
have two actual content providers in the system. Therefore, we
will have 22 actual, dummy and auxiliary content providers
in our computations. Let’s call the actual content providers
CP 1 and CP 2, the dummy content provider CP 0, and the
combination of CP 1 and CP 2 is called CP 3. We normalize
the market size X to 1. When no zero-rating exists in the
system, since Θ = 0, based on Equation 2, we have:
X1j = φ1ψj , X2j = φ2ψj , X3j = φ3ψj
Therefore, give Equation 3:
X1 =
∑
j
X1j +X3j =
∑
j
ψj(φ1 + φ3) = φ1 + φ3
and
X2 =
∑
j
X2j +X3j =
∑
j
ψj(φ2 + φ3) = φ2 + φ3
Hence, the Herfindahl index of the actual CPs would be:
HHI =
X21 +X
2
2
(X1 +X2)2
=
(φ1 + φ3)
2 + (φ2 + φ3)
2
(φ1 + φ2 + 2φ3)2
φiψjθij∑
i′
∑
j′ φi′ψj′θi′j′
α+ φiψj(1− α)
On the other hand, if everyone zero-rates in the system, we
have:
X1j = φ1ψj(1− α) + φ1ψj∑
i′
∑
j′ φi′ψj′θi′j′
α = φ1ψj(1− α)
Let’s define
A = 1− α+ α∑
i′
∑
j′ φi′ψj′θi′j′
then we have:
X1j = A× φ1ψj
Similarly, for X2j and X3j , we have:
X2j = A× φ2ψj , X3j = A× φ3ψj
Therefore:
X1 =
∑
j
X1j +X3j =
∑
j
ψj(Aφ1 +Aφ3) = A(φ1 + φ3)
and
X2 =
∑
j
X2j +X3j =
∑
j
ψj(Aφ2 +Aφ3) = A(φ2 + φ3)
Hence, the Herfindahl index of the actual CPs would be:
HHI =
X21 +X
2
2
(X1 +X2)2
=
A2(φ1 + φ3)
2 +A2(φ2 + φ3)
2
A2(φ1 + φ2 + 2φ3)2
=
(φ1 + φ3)
2 + (φ2 + φ3)
2
(φ1 + φ2 + 2φ3)2
Which is the same Herfindahl index of the case where no
zero-rating is allowed in the system.
Proof of Theorem 1: Based on Corollary 2, for any two
CPs with different values, the possible zero-rating strategies in
the equilibria are either the high-value content provider zero-
rates, or both of them zero-rate, or neither of them zero-rate.
In the last two cases, the Herfindahl index would be the same
according to Lemma 4. Further, when no one zero-rates, the
market shares would be the same as when no zero-rating is
allowed in the system, therefore the Herfindahl index would
be the same. In the first case, based on Corollary 1, the high-
value content provider would attract more customers if it zero-
rates. Since the high-value content provider is the one with the
higher baseline market share, after it zero-rates, its market
share would further increase from its baseline. Therefore,
the gap between market shares increases as well. This could
extend to multiple CPs where the variance of the market shares
would increase in this case. Hence, based on Lemma 3, the
Herfindahl index increases as well.
Proof of Theorem 2 when a low-value CP cannot zero-
rate, any zero-rating relation that its high-value opponent
establishes will decrease its utility. The reason is that based
on Equation 2, in case there is any zero-rating relations in the
market (Θ 6= 0), the market share of a pair of CP i and ISP
j is computed from
ρij(Θ) =
φiψjθij∑
i′
∑
j′ φi′ψj′θi′j′
α+ φiψj(1− α)
If low-value CP 1 does not zero-rate, θ1j = 0 ∀j ∈ M.
Therefore, the first term in Equation 2 will be zero and as
a result, if θ2j = 1 ∃j ∈ M, the elastic users of CP 1 will
move to CP 2. Based on Equation 4, the utility of CP 1
produced from each ISP j will be computed from the term
U j1 (Θ) = q1X1j(Θ).c, and as Xij = Xρij decreases, CP 1’s
utility decreases as well.
However, if CP 2 zero-rates with ISP j, the same analysis
cannot be applied to its utility. Even though based on Corollary
1, in case θ2j = 1 ∃j ∈M the market share of CP 2 increases,
as it is also paying the bandwidth price of pj to ISP j, its
utility computation is different than when it is not zero-rating
(U j2 (Θ) = (q2 − δjpj)X2j(Θ) if θ2j = 1 versus U j2 (Θ) =
(q2)X2j(Θ).c if θ2j = 0). However, based on the definition
of ZRE we can prove its utility would not decrease. In ZRE,
if low-value CP does not zero-rate while the high-value CP
does, i.e., θ1j = 0 and θ2j = 1, it would not be a ZRE if
it decreases high-value CP’s utility compared to θ1j = 0 and
θ2j = 0. Therefore, when low-value CP 1 does not zero-rate,
any zero-rating relation of CP 2 after ZRE will either increase
its utility or keep it unchanged.
APPENDIX II
In this section, we consider the case where ISPs decide what
price discounts (δ) to offer for zero-rating. These discounts are
in the spirit of bulk discounts, as the CP would be paying for
all of its users in bulk. For simplicity of computations, we
assume each ISP j chooses δj from the set {0.0, 0.1, ..., 1.0}.
We define δ¯j , {0.0, 0.1, ..., 1.0} − {δj}, and we denote the
discount strategy of all ISPs except for ISP j by δ−j . A
discount profile δ is defined as a Nash equilibrium if there
exists a ZRE built on that, and for the resulting ISP revenues
we have Rj |(δj ,δ−j) ≥ Rj |(δ¯j ,δ−j) for all ISP j. Since there
might be multiple values of δ satisfying this condition, we
choose δ to be the maximum among those who lead to
equilibria. We further assume that the more expensive ISP
is the tie breaker. For instance, if ISP 2 has a higher per
bandwidth unit price than ISP 1, i.e., p2 ≥ p1, in case we have
a tie between different vectors of δ, the one will be chosen
which has a higher δ2.
We again use our benchmark scenario on Figure 2 where
we had q = (0.4, 1.0), φ = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), ψ =
(0.2, 0.4, 0.4), α = 0.5, and c = 0.5. Figure 8 (a) depicts
the final equilibria in the market where both CPs and ISPs
make zero-rating decisions, and Figure 8 depicts CPs’ utilities
and HHI changes corresponding to Figure 8 (a). Furthermore,
Table III shows the discount profiles δ of the ISPs. Compared
to Figure 2 where δ = 1 and it is remained constant, we
observe that the number of zero-rating relations increases after
ZRE. The reason is that as Table III shows, the ISPs may offer
discounts for some price profiles so that they attract CPs to
zero-rate with them, and as a result expand their market. Note
that these price discounts are derived from Nash equilibria
and as ISPs are also decision maker agents, they choose their
discounts high enough to maximize their rewards given a
particular profile the rest of the market has.
As in Figure 8, we observe the difference in utilities of CPs,
and market HHI after equilibria when zero-rating is available
minus when it is not. We see that the general pattern of the
utility loss for low-value CP 1 and the utility gain for high-
value CP 2 are similar to the benchmark in Figure 3, with
slight changes due to ISP price discounts. The reason for these
(a) ZRE, varying δ (b) CP 1’s utility changes (c) CP 2’s utility changes (d) HHI changes
Figure 8. zero-rating equilibria and the differences in CPs’ utilities and HHI when zero-rating is available and the market reaches equilibria, minus when
zero-rating is not available. We have: α = 0.5, c = 0.5, φ = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), ψ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4), and q = (0.4, 1.0).
p2
p1 0. 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0 (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 0.9) (1.0, 0.8) (1.0, 0.7) (1.0, 0.6) (1.0, 0.5)
0.1 (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 0.9) (1.0, 0.8) (1.0, 0.7) (1.0, 0.6) (1.0, 0.5)
0.2 (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 0.8) (1.0, 0.7) (1.0, 0.6) (1.0, 1.0)
0.3 (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 0.7) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 0.6)
0.4 (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 0.6)
0.5 (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 0.9) (1.0, 0.8) (1.0, 0.7) (1.0, 0.6)
0.6 (0.9, 1.0) (0.9, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 0.8) (1.0, 0.7) (1.0, 1.0)
0.7 (0.8, 1.0) (0.8, 1.0) (0.8, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (0.9, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0)
0.8 (0.7, 1.0) (0.7, 1.0) (0.7, 1.0) (0.7, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (0.8, 1.0) (0.8, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 0.9) (1.0, 0.8)
0.9 (0.6, 1.0) (0.6, 1.0) (0.6, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (0.7, 1.0) (0.7, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (0.9, 1.0) (0.9, 0.9) (0.9, 0.8)
1.0 (0.5, 1.0) (0.5, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (0.6, 1.0) (0.6, 1.0) (0.6, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (1.0, 1.0) (0.8, 1.0) (0.8, 0.9) (0.8, 0.8)
Table III
DISCOUNT PROFILE δ OF ISPS UNDER COMPLEMENTARY DUOPOLY ZRE OF FIGURE 8.
changes is also that offering a discount would have a similar
impact on CPs’ side of the market as if the ISP has a cheaper
price.
We conclude that even when ISPs make decisions on what
price discounts to offer, the general behavior of the market
and the notion that zero-rating harming the low-value CP and
favoring the high-value one remains unchanged, but we have
included this analysis in the Appendix for completeness. Note
that since the graphs for different parameter selections are also
qualitatively similar to those in Section V and mostly follow
the same trends, we have not included them to the Appendix.
